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ABSTRACT 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP) by Adolf A. 
Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, published in 1932, is undisputedly the most 
influential work ever written in the field of corporate governance. In a 
nutshell, Berle and Means argued that corporate control had been usurped 
by a new class of managers, the result of which included (1) shareholder 
loss of control (a basic property right), (2) questionable corporate 
objectives and behavior, and (3) the potential breakdown of the market 
mechanism. In this paper, I examine the origins of MCPP, paying 
particular attention to the authors’ underlying motives. I argue that 
shareholder primacy was not the principal motive. Rather, the principal 
underlying motive was the well-documented growing gap between 
potential gross domestic product (GDP) and actual GDP in the 1920s, a 
problem they, like myriad other period writers, attributed to managerial 
behavior—in short, a breakdown of governance. In this regard, MCPP 
should be seen as analogous in scope to the period writings of Thorstein 
Veblen, Paul Douglas, Henry Ford, Edward Filene, Rexford Tugwell, and 
many others in the 1920s. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP), published 
in 1932 and authored by Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, left in its 
wake an intellectual legacy that has only grown over the decades. Today, 
it is seen as the preeminent work on the question of corporate governance 
as well as a perspicacious account of developments in the U.S. economy 
in the early twentieth century. As a result, MCPP is regularly cited as the 
defining work in the fields of governance, of managerial remuneration, 
and of management behavior in general. Adding to its legendary status 
was its timing, namely at the height of the Great Depression (i.e., 1932). 
To many, MCPP merely confirmed what scholars like John Maynard 
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Keynes and others would refer to as the breakdown of the self-regulating 
market mechanism.1 The alleged culprit: managerial usurpation/piracy. In 
short, managers of the nation’s leading corporations had usurped control 
from shareholders leading to the breakdown of the self-regulating market 
mechanism. Unfortunately, a closer examination of the facts reveals 
serious problems with this view of MCPP. First, there is the question of 
timing. MCPP was published in 1932, but it was written in the mid-to-late 
1920s, a period characterized by a buoyant stock market. From 1925 to 
1930, shareholder value had more than tripled2: notwithstanding the crash 
and the ensuing depression, the 1920s were good—even great—to 
shareholders. Second, there is the phenomenal economic growth that 
characterized the 1920s, referred to in the popular literature as the Roaring 
Twenties. Clearly, whatever the managers of the MCPP’s two-hundred 
leading corporations were doing, shirking or engaging in self-serving 
behavior was not one of them. Third, among the authors’ conclusions was 
the observation that the new managerial elite had redefined the rules of the 
game, usurping the market mechanism. In short, they observed that the 
new managerial elite had successfully insulated and isolated themselves 
from the discipline of the market. Yet, the evidence seemed to show just 
the contrary. For example, the flagship piece of New Deal legislation, the 
National Industrial Recovery Act—which Berle had helped draft—was 
premised on the view that the large, dominant firms, like those in MCPP, 
had engaged or were engaging in price-cutting from 1929 to 1933, to the 
point of undermining smaller, less competitive firms. The resulting Codes 
of Fair Competition explicitly condemned aggressive price cutting by 
large corporations.3 
Another incongruity lies in the thought experiment that underlies the 
book, namely in a comparison of the classical governance structure of yore 
with that of the early twentieth century.4 Specifically, Berle and Means 
begin by assuming that throughout the nineteenth century the owners of 
capital (investment associates, partners, etc.) exercised complete control 
over the companies in question. Ideally, evidence to this effect would have 
been presented. Instead, we are presented with what is a strawman of sorts. 
                                                     
 1. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 
(1936). 
 2. Specifically, the Dow Jones Industrial Average went from 105 in January 1920 to 362 in 
September 1929. Daniel Feenberg & Jeff Miron, NBER Macrohistory Database, NAT'L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/ [https://perma.cc/5CM3-K4V3] 
(see Chapter 11 m11009b, titled U.S. Industrial Stock Price Index, Dow-Jones 12/1914–12/1968). 
 3. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196–97, 
invalidated by Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 4. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
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Another important issue is the question of managerial/corporate officer in-
formation, knowledge, and skills. Berle and Means implicitly assume that 
shareholders have as much, if not more information, knowledge, and skills 
than the corresponding managers, and as such are as well, if not better 
positioned, to provide direction to the firm. In fact, the impression one gets 
from MCPP is that the representative manager’s task consists simply of 
choosing a point on a well-defined profit function. I maintain that this was 
an important oversight on their part. 
There is also the question of proof. MCPP leaves the reader with the 
impression that the separation of ownership and control prejudices market 
outcomes—in short, the separation of ownership and control is welfare 
reducing. The problem, however, is that this fails to square with the facts. 
In fact, if anything, notwithstanding the 1930s, economic growth in both 
Berle and Means’s lifetime was stellar, to say the least. The post-WWI 
period (1918–1929) as well as the post-WWII period (1945–1975) were 
characterized by record-level growth rates (output, wages, profits, share 
prices), the latter being referred to as the “Thirty Glorious Years.”5 Yet, 
despite evidence to the contrary, Berle and Means never reconsidered their 
highly critical view of management and social welfare—if anything, the 
post-WWII period should have sufficed to spark a change of heart. Taken 
together, these incongruities serve to raise questions regarding the authors’ 
original objectives. In short, the new managerial elite referred to in MCPP 
(the two-hundred largest corporations) had contributed to the second 
industrial revolution, modernity, and the rise of America as “the” 
dominant world power. How then are we to understand MCPP? In this 
paper, I argue that MCPP was less about corporate governance than it was 
about a problem that had commanded the attention of a large part of the 
intellectual community in the 1920s, namely the apparent failure of the 
U.S. economy in the 1920s to perform at its new, technological change-
induced higher productive capacity—something I refer to as the failed 
transition (FT).6 In short, in the 1920s, the U.S. economy was 
systematically underperforming relative to its potential.7 I argue that 
MCPP was, in many regards, analogous in both scope and objective to the 
                                                     
 5. See Maddison Project Database 2018, GRONINGEN GROWTH & DEV. CTR., https://www.rug. 
nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018 [https://perma.cc/ 
G8K6-MZ4H] (statistics on world population, GDP, and per-capita). 
 6. In his 1983 rebuttal of Robert Hessen’s reappraisal of MCPP, Gardiner Means argued 
emphatically that “the main thrust of our book . . . concerns the effect of the modern corporation on 
the working of the economy as a whole.” Gardiner C. Means, Hessen’s “Reappraisal,” 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 297, 297 (1983). 
 7. See generally BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, MASS PRODUCTION, THE STOCK MARKET CRASH, 
AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION: THE MACROECONOMICS OF ELECTRIFICATION (1996) [hereinafter 
BEAUDREAU (1996)]; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921). 
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writing of University of Chicago economics professor Thorstein Veblen, 
who alleged in The Engineers and the Price System, published in 1921, 
that the nation’s managers had “sabotaged” the transition to the new, 
higher growth path defined by the new power technology that was electric 
unit drive. Essentially, he maintained that instead of raising wages (cutting 
prices) and thus ensuring an orderly transition to the new, higher growth 
path, managers responded by cutting employment in order to increase 
profits. The upshot was simple, namely that the profit motive was 
incongruent with an orderly transition in periods of technological change. 
In this regard, MCPP was analogous in scope and purpose to the work of 
such notables as University of Chicago economics professor Paul Douglas, 
Columbia University economics professor Rexford G. Tugwell, and the 
Technocracy movement.8 I maintain that MCPP was Adolf A. Berle Jr.’s 
attempt (with the assistance of Gardiner Means) at understanding and 
rationalizing the failed transition: this failure. First, this Article begins 
with a summary of the FT literature of the 1920s that describes the U.S. 
economy’s failure to transition to its new, higher capacity, along with the 
various corrective measures that were put forth at the time. Second, this 
Article proposes that MCPP should be viewed as Berle and Means’s 
contribution to this literature. Third, this Article compares Berle with Karl 
Marx, who attributed a nineteenth century FT to opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the owners of capital. To this end, Marx invoked the labor 
theory of value, according to which all wealth/value is produced by labor 
alone, the implication being that profits were not only not earned but 
instead constituted a form of theft. I argue that Berle’s managerial 
usurpation hypothesis and Marx’s theory of surplus value were 
strategems—both being unsubstantiated—intended as a justification for 
third-party involvement in resolving the FT. Fourth, the Article looks at 
the unintended consequences of MCPP, based on my findings regarding 
the authors’ original intentions. Specifically, it is argued that the stock 
market crash and the ensuing depression transformed what was an 
indictment of the managerial elite for their role in the failed transition to a 
general critique of corporate governance. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE FAILED TRANSITION 
I proposed the notion of a failed transition,9 referring to the inability 
of a market economy to make the transition to a new, higher equilibrium 
                                                     
 8. See HOWARD SCOTT ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO TECHNOCRACY (1933); REXFORD G. 
TUGWELL, INDUSTRY’S COMING OF AGE (1927); Paul H. Douglas, The Modern Technique of Mass 
Production and Its Relation to Wages, 12 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y. 663 (1927). 
 9. See generally BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, UNDERINCOME: WHEN MARKETS FAIL TO 
MONETIZE OUTPUT (2007); BEAUDREAU (1996), supra note 7. 
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growth path in response to a new process technology—in this case, electric 
unit drive powered by abundant, inexpensive public utility-generated 
electricity (EUD-PUE).10 In essence, the failure is attributed to two factors: 
the lack of incentives on the part of firms to increase wages (and 
purchasing power) in response to higher productivity, and the residual 
nature of profits.11 That is, profits are not paid up-front but rather after 
product markets clear. This makes for a situation in which a technology 
shock does not, per se, increase profits except via the reduced demand for 
labor per unit output.12 A variant of the FT hypothesis maintains that the 
root cause lies with the functional distribution of income. That is, overall 
income increases in step with potential output, but that profit income 
increases by more than wage income, resulting in under-consumption. In 
this case, profit income increases by more than the increase in potential 
output given that wages remain relatively constant. The result, however, 
is similar as firms reduce output and the demand for labor given the 
presence of unsold goods. In the former case, output does not actually 
increase as income fails to increase. Spurgeon Bell of the Brookings 
Institution described the FT of the 1920s in the following terms: 
In recent times, however, the process by which new technological 
developments are transmitted into higher standards of living is 
obviously not working smoothly. Even before the coming of the great 
depression, there appeared to be some doubt as to whether the system 
of wealth production and distribution was operating with maximum 
effectiveness. At a time when cumulative scientific knowledge might 
be expected to give us an accelerating tempo of industrial growth, the 
rate of advancement for some reason, or combination of reasons did 
not seem to be an increasing one. In any case, the issue in recent years 
has been sharply raised: can the economic system be counted upon to 
produce the beneficent economic results which were supposed to be 
the automatic accompaniment of scientific knowledge, and the 
increasing efficiency of production? Under modern conditions, do 
not technological improvement simply throw men out of work, 
destroy purchasing power, and retard economic advancement?13 
Adherents to the under-income version of the FT hypothesis included 
Henry Ford, Edward A. Filene, and Thorstein Veblen, to name a few, 
while adherents to the excess-profit-over-savings version included Senator 
                                                     
 10. See BEAUDREAU, supra note 7; Warren D. Devine, Jr., Electrified Mechanical Drive: The 
Historical Power Distribution Revolution, in ELECTRICITY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: AGENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS (Sam H. Schurr, Calvin C. Burwell, Warren D. Devine, Jr. & Sidney 
Sonenblum eds., 1990). 
 11. See generally BEAUDREAU (1996), supra note 7. 
 12. See id. 
 13. SPURGEON BELL, PRODUCTIVITY, WAGES AND NATIONAL INCOME 165 (1940). 
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Robert Wagner, Rexford G. Tugwell, Paul Douglas, and Raymond 
Morley. Tugwell and Morley, like Berle, were members of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Brains Trust, a group of intellectuals that were 
responsible for drafting the New Deal (National Industrial Recovery Act). 
 










1922 75.5 63.4 16 
1923 83.2 69.9 17 
1924 85.1 71.5 17 
1925 89.6 75.3 16 
1926 91.9 77.2 16 
1927 93.2 78.3 17 
1928 94.9 79.7 16 
1929 97.5 81.9 17 
 
Evidence of a growing output gap was amassed by the Brookings 
Institution, whose founder, Robert Brookings, adhered to the excess-
capacity account of the 1920s and 1930s.15 In an exhaustive study of U.S. 
productive capacity in the 1920s, they provided estimates in the order of 
16 to 17 percent (Table 1).16 
Without exception, the period writings on FTs went beyond simply 
describing and/or quantifying the problem. They also provided a number 
of corrective measures/policies (Table 2).17 Perhaps the most notable were 
Henry Ford’s five- and seven-dollar day, President Herbert Hoover’s 
Associative State, Paul Douglas’ three-quarters/one-quarter rule, and the 
Technocracy movement with its radical reform of production and 
distribution, not to mention exchange technology based on energy 
certificates and a guaranteed income. With missionary zeal, Henry Ford 
set out to change the managerial ethos, stressing the need to increase wages 
                                                     
 14. EDWIN GRISWOLD NOURSE & ASSOCIATES, AMERICA’S CAPACITY TO PRODUCE 176 (1934). 
 15. ROBERT S. BROOKINGS, THE WAY FORWARD (1932). 
 16. Comparable estimates are also provided in HAROLD LOEB ET AL., THE CHART OF PLENTY: A 
STUDY OF AMERICA’S PRODUCT CAPACITY BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
POTENTIAL PRODUCT CAPACITY (1935). 
 17. What distinguishes this literature from the corporate law literature (i.e., the Berle–Dodd 
Debate) is its focus on a real, identifiable problem. The corporate law literature, on the other hand, 
was couched in rather general and oftentimes vague notions such as the collective good, workers’ 
rights, stakeholders’ rights, etc. Here, the problem was not only well defined but also a source of 
agreement among writers. Where they differed, however, is in terms of their policy prescriptions. 
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and lower prices.18 While at the Department of Commerce, Hoover 
stressed corporate planning and the need to raise purchasing power.19 Paul 
Douglas went even further, arguing that the functional distribution 
followed a scientific law (3/4-1/4), thus justifying wage increases in the 
face of greater productivity.20 Perhaps the most known of these measures 
was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act, 
which called for across-the-board wage increases.21 Other non-income 
based measures include tariff policy (Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930), 
fiscal policy (President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1936 undistributed profits, 
corporate income tax), labor legislation (the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935), and government expenditure (New Deal I and II). Each of these 
was intended to correct the FT.22 
 
Table 2: FT Literature and the Corresponding Policies/Measures 
Author Policies 
Thorstein Veblen23        Engineer-governed economy  
Henry Ford24              Five- and seven-dollar day, New management ethos  
Rexford Tugwell25            Higher wages, taxes on profits     
Paul Douglas26            Higher wages 
Howard Scott27                Technocracy 
Robert Brookings28           Higher wages 
Senator Reed Smoot29       Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 
Franklin Roosevelt30         National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
Senator Robert Wagner31   National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Unionization 
                                                     
 18. See HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK (1922) [hereinafter FORD (1922)]; HENRY FORD, 
TODAY AND TOMORROW (1926) [hereinafter FORD (1926)]. 
 19. Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of the 
“Associative State,” 1921–1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 16 (1974). 
 20. See Douglas, supra note 8. 
 21. This included the wage increases found in the 597 Codes of Fair Competition as well as the 
President’s Reemployment Act of 1933. 
 22. See BEAUDREAU (1996), supra note 7. 
 23. See VEBLEN, supra note 7. 
 24. See FORD (1922), supra note 18; FORD (1926), supra note 18. 
 25. See TUGWELL, supra note 8; REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE 
GOVERNMENTAL ARTS (1933). 
 26. See Douglas, supra note 8. 
 27. See HOWARD SCOTT ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO TECHNOCRACY (1933). 
 28. See BROOKINGS, supra note 15. 
 29. See BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, MAKING SENSE OF SMOOT-HAWLEY, TECHNOLOGY AND 
TARIFFS (2005). 
 30. See Bernard C. Beaudreau & Jason E. Taylor, Why Did the Roosevelt Administration Think 
Cartels, Higher Wages, and Shorter Workweeks Would Promote Recovery from the Great Depression, 
23 INDEP. REV. 91 (2018). 
 31 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to Be: A Prospectus, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2201 (1998). 
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The key point here is the overwhelming emphasis on management 
and management practices. Most adherents to the FT view pointed an 
accusing finger at management, stressing the need for a new ethos of sorts, 
one that would allow the economy to take full advantage of the new 
technology that was electric unit drive.32 MCPP, I submit, was Berle and 
Means’s contribution to this literature in that it proposed a rationale for 
what was seen as destructive, transition-aborting managerial behavior. 
II. FT AND MCPP: THE EVIDENCE 
Evidence that the FT was at the heart of the MCPP comes in a 
number of forms. For example, there is 1932 Democrat presidential 
candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt’s California Commonwealth Club 
Address (September 23, 1932), penned by Adolf A. Berle Jr., in which 
government intervention is introduced as an optimal response to the 
problem of insufficient demand, itself the result of the absence of what had 
been up until then a key part of the second industrial revolution, namely 
the Western frontier. In short, growth in the post-Civil War era had been 
fueled by the ever-expanding frontier, creating the necessary demand 
conditions for the industrial revolution underway.33 However, by the early 
twentieth century, the frontier had disappeared, and with it, the demand 
conditions that had sustained growth, making government expenditure and 
intervention necessary. 
 A glance at the situation today only too clearly indicates that 
equality of opportunity as we have known it no longer exists. Our 
industrial plant is built; the problem just now is whether under 
existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our last frontier has long since 
been reached, and there is practically no more free land. More than 
half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot 
derive a living by cultivating their own property. There is no safety 
valve in the form of a Western prairie to which those thrown out of 
work by the Eastern economic machines can go for a new start. We 
are not able to invite the immigration from Europe to share our 
endless plenty. We are now providing a drab living for our own 
people. 
                                                     
 32. Perhaps the most high-profile of these were Henry Ford and Edward A. Filene, two 
businessmen who, with missionary zeal, attempted to change the managerial ethos, stressing mass 
production, higher wages, and lower prices. See EDWARD A. FILENE, SUCCESSFUL LIVING IN THIS 
MACHINE AGE 1 (1931); EDWARD A. FILENE, THE WAY OUT: A FORECAST OF COMING CHANGES IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 93–104, 234–57 (1924); FORD (1926), supra note 18, at 38–50. 
A similar argument can be found in WILLIAM TRUFANT FOSTER & WADDILL CATCHINGS, BUSINESS 
WITHOUT A BUYER 172 (1928). 
 33. See CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 213–15. 
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. . . . 
 As I see it, the task of Government in its relation to business is 
to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an 
economic constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman 
and business man. It is the minimum requirement of a more 
permanently safe order of things.  
Happily, the times indicate that to create such an order not only 
is the proper policy of Government, but it is the only line of safety 
for our economic structures as well. We know, now, that these 
economic units cannot exist unless prosperity is uniform, that is, 
unless purchasing power is well distributed throughout every group 
in the Nation.34 
However, perhaps the most convincing piece of evidence comes 
from MCPP itself, where, in Chapter 1, the concern over large 
conglomerates involves the question of saving; more specifically, of free 
cash flow (retained earnings), where a substantial portion of profits are 
withheld by the two-hundred corporations, hence not paid out as 
dividends. As it turns out, this is a direct off-shoot of the excess-savings 
hypothesis that had gained traction in the late 1920s, being found in the 
writings of Rexford Tugwell, Paul Douglas, and numerous others. Berle 
and Means tendered another cause, namely increasing firm size, increasing 
concentration and managerial usurpation. Put differently, the savings glut 
referred to earlier, in whole or in part, could be attributed to the managerial 
elite, which had usurped not only control but also resources, thus hindering 
the transition. 
More proof comes by way of Berle and Means’s focus on the role of 
firm size and industry concentration on pricing behavior. Again, given the 
lack of competition, firms wielding market power were less inclined to cut 
prices in the face of excess capacity.35 In his 1935 brief to Congress, 
Gardiner Means proposed a dichotomization of U.S. markets into (1) those 
in which prices are administered (i.e., administered prices), and (2) those 
which are market-based (i.e., market-based prices). Administered prices 
(the purview of the two-hundred large conglomerates in MCPP) were set 
                                                     
 34. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor of N.Y., Address at the Commonwealth Club in San 
Francisco, California (Sept. 23, 1932). 
 35. As it turns out, these notions would be formalized in the monopolistic competition literature 
with contributions by Edward Chamberlin, Joan Robinson, and Paul Sweezy. The underlying idea was 
that firms had acquired a form of market power that de facto insulated them from competition. See 
Edward H. Chamberlin, The Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic Competition Theory, 75 
Q.J. ECON. 515, 515–16 (1961). 
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by large conglomerates and were, as such, less responsive to market 
forces.36 
The last piece of evidence is an article published in 1921 entitled 
How Labor Could Control by Adolf A. Berle—the same year Thorstein 
Veblen published The Engineers and the Price System—in which he 
outlined his view of how the corporation could be used as a tool for the 
redistribution of wealth and power to the “staff of the plant.”37 The “staff” 
in this case included the managers and the board members as well as the 
workers. 
Distant Cousins?: Veblen’s Managerial Sabotage and  
BM’s Notion of Shareholder Usurpation 
It is my view that Berle and Means’s notion of managerial usurpation 
has much in common with Thorstein Veblen’s notion of “managerial 
sabotage.”38 Veblen argued that by not raising wages and/or cutting prices 
in response to greater production/cost efficiency, for-profit managers 
sabotaged the transition, thus denying society the gains from the new 
technique. Berle and Means made a similar argument, pointing out that 
managers were no longer behaving in what could be referred to as the 
appropriate manner. In Berle and Means’s case, they were engaging in 
excess saving behavior and resisting price decreases (owing to greater 
concentration). According to Veblen: 
Without some salutary restraint in the way of sabotage on the 
productive use of the available industrial plant and workmen, it is 
altogether unlikely that prices could be maintained at a reasonably 
profitable figure for any appreciable time. A businesslike control of 
the rate and volume of output is indispensable for keeping up a 
profitable market, and a profitable market is the first and unremitting 
condition of prosperity in any community whose industry is owned 
and managed by business men. And the ways and means of this 
necessary control of the output of industry are always and necessarily 
something in the nature of sabotage—something in the way of 
retardation, restriction, withdrawal, unemployment of plant and 
workmen—whereby production is kept short of productive capacity. 
 The mechanical industry of the new order is inordinately 
productive. So the rate and volume of output have to be regulated 
                                                     
 36. See GARDINER C. MEANS, INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND THEIR RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY, S. 
DOC. NO. 13-E-7, at 24–25 (1935). 
 37. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., How Labor Could Control, 28 NEW REPUBLIC 37, 38 (1921). 
 38. Charles O’Kelley made a similar argument, pointing out that “[i]t is clear that Berle shared 
Veblen’s belief that control was responsible for the periodic underutilization of factories and 
manpower.” See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1317, 1348 (2011). 
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with a view to what the traffic will bear—that is to say, what will 
yield the largest net return in terms of price to the business men who 
manage the country’s industrial system.39 
Berle and Means, however, focused on the legalities—or 
illegalities—of this new form of industrial organization and management, 
emphasizing the question of power and property. One could argue that 
such was Adolf A. Berle Jr.’s intellectual comparative advantage, being 
the legal scholar that he was. In short, the managers of the two hundred 
corporations in question had shirked their fiduciary duties and thus were 
guilty. Veblen, on the other hand, put the onus on financial capital that had 
commandeered the principal sectors of the U.S. economy. 
As it turned out, this was the basis for Veblen’s proposed solution, 
namely a plan for a “soviet of technicians,” or technocrats, that would 
manage the economy in lieu of profit-seeking managers. In short, 
managers would give way to “several thousand technically trained men 
scattered over the face of the country, in one industry and another; must 
carry out a passably complete cadastration of the country’s industrial 
forces; must set up practicable organization tables covering the country’s 
industry in some detail—energy-resources, materials, and man power.”40 
This would eventually be realized in the form of the Technocracy 
movement with its emphasis on the role of energy in material processes 
and its advocation of a new class of managers, the Technate, composed 
largely of engineers whose goal would be to optimize/maximize output, 
thus eliminating the problem of excess capacity.41 
III. MARX AND BERLE, TWO PEAS IN A POD? 
In this section, I argue that while the similarities with Veblen were 
important, they were even more pronounced in the case of nineteenth 
century political economist Karl Marx. Specifically, both Marx and Berle 
had much in common, including invoking a theoretical/conceptual 
stratagem as a basis for advocating profound change in the workings of 
the economy: the labor theory of value (in the case of Marx) and the 
shareholder usurpation theory (in the case of Berle).42 The labor theory of 
                                                     
 39. VEBLEN, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 40. Id. at 139. 
 41. See SCOTT, supra note 27, at 39–49. 
 42. It is interesting to note that Berle saw himself as a twentieth-century version of Marx, 
defending the rights of workers and investors (stakeholders) vis-a-vis managers. According to Fenner 
Stewart, Jr., 
[Berle] envisioned the distribution of corporate ownership through the middle and working 
classes as a mechanism to place the power of economic concentration under a form of 
democratic control through shareholder power. In fact, Berle had the bold ambition of 
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value provided Marx with the theoretical basis for his concept of surplus 
value or, more formally, the rate of surplus value.43 According to Marx, 
given that labor was the only physically productive factor input, payments 
to the owners of capital amounted to a form of theft. Moreover, the greater 
the rate of surplus value, the greater profits and the less purchasing power 
in the hands of workers. The only way to correct this anomaly, and thus 
ensure an orderly transition, according to Marx, was via state/third party 
control—in short, socialism or communism. In the case of Berle and 
Means, the solution was to be found—at least in part—in what they 
referred to as the “law of corporations,” which they saw as “a potential 
constitutional law for the new economic state”: 
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern 
state—economic power versus political power, each strong in its own 
field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, 
while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes 
every effort to avoid such regulation. . . . The future may see the 
economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an 
equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the 
dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, 
accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional 
law for the new economic state, while business practice is 
increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.44 
There are, however, problems with both arguments. In the case of 
Marx, it lies with the technical underpinnings of the labor theory of value, 
specifically the fact that by the mid-nineteenth century labor was no longer 
physically productive but rather had been reduced to a supervisory input. 
In other words, not only was capital not physically productive (according 
to classical mechanics), but labor in the factory system was also no longer 
physically productive.45 In short, the labor theory of value was a strategem 
of sorts whose purpose was to legitimize/justify his proposed solution to 
the problem of the nineteenth century FT. 
                                                     
becoming the prophet of the shareholding class, or as he so modestly put it, “the American 
Karl Marx.” 
Fenner Stewart, Jr., Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective for 
Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457, 1465 (2011) (citing 
JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN 62 (1987)). 
 43. The level of surplus value (s) is defined as the excess of value of product over value of inputs. 
The value of inputs is defined as the sum of constant capital (c) and variable capital (v). As such, the 
total value of product is defined as C = (c + v) + s. The rate of surplus value is simply s/c. 
 44. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 357 (Macmillan 1933). 
 45. The only physically-productive factor input was the steam engine, which provided the energy 
that powered all material processes. 
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The same was true of Berle and Means. As a number of writers have 
since shown, shareholders (as distinct from owner-managed firms) in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries never de facto controlled firms 
beyond threatening to withdraw their investment or sell their share. This 
owed, in most cases, to the lack of either knowledge or skills 
(understanding of the products/processes/markets) and/or the increased 
capital requirements that resulted in diffused ownership. However, Berle 
and Means hoped to use the legal argument as a lever towards what many 
describe as a stakeholder view of the firm. This, however, would be 
achieved via the issuance of worker-held shares/equity.46 Moreover, it is 
my view that Berle’s position in the celebrated Berle–Dodd debate was 
motivated by strategic concerns. In other words, his espousal of the 
shareholder primacy view was a necessary condition for making a case for 
a new arrangement in which workers would become shareholders. The 
Dodd stakeholder view, while not dissimilar, would have invalidated the 
very basis of Berle’s approach. In other words, it would have legitimized 
the role of managers as arbitrators in the distribution of income. The point 
here is that while both positions shared a common objective, the means to 
such an end were fundamentally different. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the shareholder dilution theory 
was also a stratagem of sorts. The shareholder dilution theory alleged that 
the number of shareholders in the early twentieth century had increased 
such that no one shareholder held a controlling interest. While holdings 
were in fact diluted in the early twentieth century, this was not new, having 
characterized the U.K. and U.S. economy throughout the nineteenth 
century.47 In fact, in Das Kapital, Marx had referred to the separation of 
ownership from control.48 Further, Eric Hilt has shown that throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, ownership in U.S. corporations was 
highly diluted.49 It is my view that shareholder dilution theory was an 
instrument intended to strengthen the case for third-party intervention. In 
other words, the shareholder dilution theory was a call-to-arms of sorts, 
intended to spur on and motivate a policy response. 
                                                     
 46. This view originated in Berle’s early writings. For example, in Berle, supra note 37, at 31–
39, Berle argued in favor of shareholder primacy as a necessary prerequisite to a new, radical form of 
income distribution based on both investor-held and worker-held shares. In other words, shareholder 
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 48. 3 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL ch. 27 (1894).  
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In the late nineteenth century, the labor theory of value was replaced 
by neoclassical production theory according to which both labor and 
capital were physically productive. However, while this solved the 
Marxian conundrum (i.e., justifying profits), it only muddied the waters 
more as capital (tools and structures) was not, according to basic physics, 
productive because it is not a source of energy.50 
 
Table 3: Marx and BM’s Stratagems: Fact and Fiction 
 
Author Stratagem Fact 
Karl Marx 
(1867)        
Labor Theory of Value   
Rate of Surplus Value    
− Labor is a supervisory input. 
− Labor is not physically 
productive. 
Berle and Means 
(1932) 
Managerial Usurpation   − The owners of capital never 
controlled the firm. 
− Capital (tools and structures) is 
not physically productive. 
− Presence of organization capital. 
 
This leads us to conclude that, despite the commonly held view, 
MCPP was not ultimately about shareholder primacy per se. Rather, 
shareholder primacy should be understood as a means to an end and one 
intended to legitimize Berle and Means’s proposed solution to the 
overriding problem in the 1920s, namely the failure of the U.S. economy 
to perform at its potential.51 Fate would have it that the stock market 
crashed in 1929, and the economy fell into a severe depression, which 
changed both the context and nature of the ensuing debate over the issue 
of governance. As such, I maintain that MCPP should be understood not 
as an ode to shareholder primacy, nor as a critique of managerial behavior 
in the midst of the downturn/Great Depression, but rather the authors’ 
attempt at analyzing and providing a solution to the problem of the FT in 
the 1920s. 
                                                     
 50. See, e.g., BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, ENERGY AND ORGANIZATION: GROWTH AND 
DISTRIBUTION REEXAMINED 109 (1998); Bernard C. Beaudreau, The Problem with Production 
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Berle’s theory of the Corporate Liberal Revolution is significant to understand because it 
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was not an end for Berle, it was merely a means to an end. 
Stewart, supra note 42, at 1463. 
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IV. WHY MCPP HINDERED PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It is my view that contrary to the accepted wisdom that MCPP 
brought the problem of governance to the fore (although the authors were 
neither the first nor the only ones to raise the problem), it actually hindered 
progress in the field of corporate governance. This is based, in large 
measure, on two factors: (1) Berle and Means’s original intent/interests 
and (2) the unscientific nature of MCPP. MCPP was not an attempt on the 
part of two scholars, one legal and the other economic, to understand the 
question of control within both the pre- and post-second industrial 
revolution firms. That would have entailed a detailed examination 
(technology, information, bargaining) of entrepreneurial and owner–
manager forms of organization, complete with an analysis of the choice 
space (multidimensional) of each. Instead, MCPP was based largely on 
popular sentiment and a set of preconceived notions, notably that 
ownership had become highly disparate, thus providing the basis for 
managerial largesse and failings—especially regarding the transition. 
Greater productivity had not led to higher purchasing power and a 
successful transition, but rather had led to greater savings on the part of 
corporations and rigid prices—two of the key findings of MCPP. 
MCPP resulted in the polarization of the debate; those on the right 
refuted MCPP’s conclusions, and those on the left used MCPP to further 
their agenda. The debate soon degenerated into a shouting match, which 
explains, in large measure, the little real progress that has been achieved 
in the field. The political right continues to see governance in terms of 
agency theory, while the left sees it in MCPP terms, namely that managers 
have usurped and continue to usurp control. Unfortunately, neither school 
has presented a convincing theory complete with corroborating evidence. 
Agency relationship has been systematically refuted,52 and the MCPP has 
failed to gain traction as a theory of managerial behavior, except when 
there is a scandal (e.g., the Financial Crisis of 2008). 
This leaves many questions unanswered, including what do 
managers actually do? What is the role of organization capital in the 
firm?53 How do scarcity and managerial skills influence the question of 
corporate control? I, for example, have proposed a bargaining approach to 
                                                     
 52. See Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 82 
(Michael C. Jensen & Clifford H. Smith Jr. eds., 1984). 
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control in which the owners of organization capital and the owners of 
physical capital bargain over a state space that includes the return on 
capital and uncertainty/risk. The resulting equilibria include cases in 
which, given the underlying uncertainty, shareholders earn an above-
average rate of return on their investment in return for having assumed 
risk/uncertainty. 
Ironically, while the problem MCPP set out to address (i.e., the failed 
transition) had been resolved by the end of WWII—largely as the result of 
government expenditure—its basic underlying argument went on to live a 
long and illustrious life as the cornerstone of corporate law. This was 
unfortunate as it hindered real progress in the field of corporate 
governance. Today, the owners of tools and structures are still seen as the 
de facto and de jure corporation, despite being a passive and physically 
unproductive factor input. The important role of organizational capital in 
the rise of the modern corporation continues to be ignored.54 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this Article, I have argued that the MCPP, the work that single-
handedly launched the field of corporate governance, was less about the 
question of shareholder primacy and more about the 1920s problem of the 
failed transition from a lower to a higher equilibrium growth path. As such, 
it should be seen as belonging to a period of literature that included the 
writings of Thorstein Veblen, Paul Douglas, Rexford Tugwell, Henry 
Ford, Edward Filene, and numerous others, each pointing an accusing 
finger at the managerial class for the purported failure. 
This explains—or at least goes a long way to explain—the 
incongruities found in both MCPP and the many writings of Adolf A. 
Berle Jr. MCPP should, as such, be understood not as an attempt to 
understand corporate governance per se, but as Berle and Means’s attempt 
to understand the FT in the 1920s, attributing it to greater savings on the 
part of the two hundred large corporations studied as well as their alleged 
failure to behave according to basic, fundamental economic principles 
(i.e., cutting price in the face of excess supply). 
I am also of the view that Berle and Means’s inability to distinguish 
between what was an episodic problem (i.e., the FT) and the steady-state 
or the long-term tainted the bulk of their work, resulting in glaring 
incongruities and contradictions. For example, despite their dire warnings, 
the post-WWII period witnessed record growth in wages and profits, 
experiencing the most prosperous period in its history. Yet, Berle and 
Means persevered with their critique of managers. 
                                                     
 54. See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 498–500. 
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Lastly, I argued that while the MCPP was largely about the failed 
transition, the events of 1929 to 1932, specifically the stock market crash 
and the Great Depression, transformed it into something different—a 
broad critique of the capitalist system and of its new managerial class. For 
example, the delayed recovery was attributed, by many, to the managerial 
class whose behavior no longer responded to market incentives—in this 
case, no longer adjusted prices downwards in response to excess supply. 
Unfortunately, this only served to further muddy the waters and made 
understanding the origins of MCPP all the more difficult. 
Largely ignored in the post-WWII period, MCPP became the battle 
cry for jaded shareholders but failed to gain early traction as the dominant 
view of governance and of the purported ill-effects of the new managerial 
elite. This changed with the productivity slowdown in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s when it was felt that a new breed of managers was needed to 
rekindle growth; specifically, managers who responded to incentives. 
Thus was born the era of MBA-trained, incentivized, and stock-optioned 
upper management whose ultimate goal was to restore growth to previous 
levels. It turns out, however, that they did little more than cut costs, which 
did increase profits but failed to restore growth rates to their post-WWII 
levels. 
It is my view that failure to understand the very nature and behavior 
of the very managerial elite that ushered in the second industrial revolution 
was largely to blame. They were, among other things, great visionaries 
more bent on changing the world than their stock option plans. The control 
they exerted on firms was owed to their genius, vision, and sense of 
purpose. Shareholders came on board and provided the tools, buildings, 
and other material inputs needed to realize their visions. 
